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Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture:
April 5, 2012

ABOUT ABORTION:
THE COMPLICATIONS OF THE CATEGORY
Carol Sanger*

I.

ABOUT "ABOUT"

My subject this afternoon is abortion, a subject that for the last 40 years
has embedded itself in American consciousness, American politics, and American
culture with remarkable durability and reach. Looking only at the first decade of
this century-from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, to use two presidential
landmarks-abortion has been central to how Americans conceptualize, debate,
and sometimes resolve all sorts of things: foreign aid, health care reform, high
school sex education, and judicial nominations to the Supreme Court. Abortion has
been at the heart of disputes over what products Walmart keeps on its shelves,
whether Super Bowl fans should watch or boycott half-time advertisements, and
what health care services are available to pregnant servicewomen serving abroad.'
Reliably divisive, the subject is never far out of sight; it stands at the ready to stir
the pot or, depending on one's viewpoint, to bring sudden clarity to whatever issue
is under discussion.
Each year brings new controversies over something to do with abortion.
Some involve popular culture: rap lyrics (Can I Live?) sung by a fetus to his
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1.

See Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058,

106041 (9th Cir. 2005)

(upholding a regulation barring military health services from funding abortions, including
an instance where a sailor's wife aborted her anencephalic fetus).
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abortion-minded mother;2 the slow creep of abortion decision-making into
television programs, both real (Pregnant and 16) and fictional (Friday Night
Lights, Sex and the City, and even Maude ages ago);3 or the question of whether a
Doonesbury series on Texas's ultrasound requirement should be carried on the
funnies page, the editorial, or cancelled altogether.4 Other abortion controversies
bring to the surface issues of long-standing social tension, such as those around
race. In 2011, a huge billboard appeared in Manhattan featuring a pretty black
child in a sundress above the caption "The Most Dangerous Place for an African
American is in the Womb." Similar billboards ("Black Children are an
Endangered Species") went up in Atlanta, all part of a larger pro-life outreach
campaign to minority communities denouncing legal abortion as part of a
genocidal plan.
Things seem to be about abortion even when the link to abortion may not
on first glance be entirely clear-a ban on stem cell research, a bomb at the 2000
Atlanta Olympics, the brain-dead Terry Schiavo-or where on second glance, the
connection may not be entirely accurate. I have in mind the proposition that
abortion increases a woman's chance of developing breast cancer (and whether
such discredited data would be posted on the National Cancer Institute website)6 or

2.

See Annette John-Hall, Rapper's Abortion-Themed Video Is Striking a

Chord, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 2, 2005, at E01; Kelefa Sanneh, An Unborn Fetus with a
Messagefor Mom, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, § 2, at 1.
3.

Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life,

106 CoLUM. L. REV. 753, 822 n.427 (2006) (discussing how abortion is a taboo topic on
television) [hereinafter Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws].
4.
Ewen MacAskill, Doonesbury Abortion Cartoon Dropped by US
Newspapers, GUARDIAN, March 12, 2012, at 21.
5.
Shalila Dewan, To Court Blacks, Foes of Abortion Make Racial Case, N.Y.

Feb. 27, 2010, at Al. The claim is that the disproportionately high rate of abortion
among minority women results from a white conspiracy to decimate the black population.
Population researchers have a different explanation. See Joerg Dreweke, No Conspiracy
TIMES,

Theories Needed: Higher Abortion Rates Among Women of Color Reflect HigherRates of
Unintended Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.guttmacher.org/
media/nr/2008/08/13/index.html. The New York billboard was itself the subject of further
controversy; the child's picture had been taken two years earlier at an unconnected photo
shoot at a modeling agency. See Associated Press, Mother of Girl in Anti-abortion Ad
Wants Apology, WALL ST. J., March 5, 2011.
See H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, Investigating the State of
6.
Science Under the Bush Administration: Breast Cancer Risks, http://oversight.house.gov/
/politicsand-science/examplebreastcancer.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). In 2003, the
National Cancer Institute website was corrected to report that "having an abortion or
miscarriage does not increase a woman's subsequent risk of developing breast cancer."
Inst.,
Abortion, Miscarriage, and Breast Cancer Risk,
Nat'l
Cancer
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/abortion-miscarriage (last visited May
31, 2012); accord Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Realities, 9
GUTTMACHER POL'Y REv. 3 (2006). Nonetheless, five states still include information in their
mandatory pre-abortion counseling materials on a possible link between abortion and breast
cancer. Chinue Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical
Accuracy ofState-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials,9 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REv. 4
(2006).
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the Freakonomics claim that legalizing abortion lowered the crime rate. There is
also public contestation over the preliminary question of whether a particular issue
has anything to do with abortion in the first place. Consider the enactment in
recent years of "Missing Angel Acts," 8 statutes that authorize the issuance of birth
certificates for stillborn infants. The Acts resulted from lobbying by bereaved
parents who successfully argued in state after state that a fetal death certificate, the
form of documentation that has traditionally accompanied stillbirth, failed to
capture the true nature of their loss.? Despite enormous sympathy for the parents,
concerns were raised (in some states) that creating birth certificates for children
who never lived-certificates commemorating life before and in the absence of
live birth-might eventually play a part in the continuing campaign against
abortion.10 Missing Angel supporters insist that the legislation is not about
abortion, but only about ?,roviding parents solace through the official recognition
of their child's existence. The concern remained, however, that it may no longer
be possible to cabin the cultural or political meaning of anything to do with fetal
life or death in the United States.' 2 Thus, the language of Missing Angel Acts was
clarified to make sure that stillborn birth certificates could be issued only on
parental request, and never in a case of abortion.13 The example illustrates how
cautious the subject of abortion has made everyone (not always unreasonably so)
and how attentive citizens have become to even the possibility of an abortion
connection.

7.
See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, FurtherEvidence that Legalized
Abortion Lowered Crime: A Reply to Joyce, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 29 (2004); John J.
Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 106 Q. J.
ECON. 379 (2001). See also Christopher L. Foote & Christopher F. Goetz, Comment, The
Impact ofLegalized Abortion on Crime, 123 Q. J.ECON. 407 (2008). But see Ted Joyce, Did
Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCEs 1 (2004); Steven D. Levitt,
UnderstandingWhy Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factorsthat Explain the Decline and Six
That Do Not, 18 J. EcON. PERSP. 163, 186 (2004) (concluding that increased incarceration,
increases in the number of police, the receding crack epidemic, and legalized abortion are

all factors in the decline of crime); John R. Lott Jr. & John Whitley, Abortion and Crime:
Unwanted Children and Out-of-Wedlock Births, 45 EcoN. INQUIRY 304 (2007).
8.
See MTSSing Angels Bill (MAB) Legislation-State Chart, M.I.S.S. FOUND.
(July 25, 2011), http://missingangelsbill.org/index.php?option=com content&view=article
&id=76&Itemid=61 (noting that as of July 25, 2011, 32 states have enacted Missing Angels
Bills).
See Carol Sanger, "The Birth ofDeath ": Stillborn Birth Certificatesand the
9.
Problem for Law, 100 CAL. L. REv. 269, 272 (2012) [hereinafter Sanger, "The Birth of
Death'].
See id. at 274, 305-08; see also Allison Stevens, The Politics of Stillbirth,
10.
AM. PROSPECT (July 13, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/politics-stillbirth (highlighting the
fear of abortion rights advocates that issuing "certificates for stillborn birth" will chip away
at abortion rights).
11.
See Sanger, "The Birth of Death," at 306; see also M.I.S.S. FOUND.,
http://www.missingangelsbill.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
12.
See Sanger, "The Birth ofDeath," at 305.
13.
Id. at 307; Frequently Asked Questions, M.I.S.S. FOUND. (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://www.missingangelsbill.org/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=75&It
emid=4 1.
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So what is going on? Why is so much around us about abortion? My
argument here is that so many things are about abortion, at least in the United
States, because abortion itself is about so many things. I therefore want to begin by
setting out the central categories into which abortion falls as a way of beginning to
understand how much is at stake when people talk about or around the issue. That
is to say, in this lecture I want to talk about "about."
In proceeding, it may be useful to start with an accepted definition of
abortion. The term refers to the induced (intentional) termination of a pregnancy
through the destruction of the embryo or fetus.14 Where abortion is legal, this is
usually performed by a doctor either surgically (with instruments), or since the
development and subsequent approval of the drug mifepristone in the late 1990s,
through induced miscarriage (this is called "medical abortion").' 5 So abortion is,
perhaps in the first instance, a medical procedure and in this regard a crucial aspect
of obstetric care within the medical, research, and public health communities.
Thirteen percent of all deaths included in maternal mortality statistics worldwide
are deaths from unsafe abortions.' 6
The characterization of abortion as medical is important in other, nonclinical ways. It matters to how abortion is treated at law, for like other forms of
medical care, abortion is subject to regulation as part of the state's general interest
in the health and welfare of its citizens. Under the state's "police power," all
doctors are licensed, medical facilities inspected, and drugs tested before they are
approved for use. Of course, the regulation of abortion is not quite the same as that
of other medical procedures. Since the development of a robust pro-life movement
following the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,'7 abortion has
become the most regulated medical procedure in the United States.
Abortion is also about rights. In Roe, the Supreme Court announced that
the constitutional right of privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 9 Until then, abortion had not

14.
See Abortion Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/abortion (last visited Sept. 29, 2012).
15.
Susan Dudley & Stephanie Mueller, What is Medical Abortion?, NAT'L
ABORTION FED'N (SEPT. 2008), http://www.prochoice.org/pubs-research/publications/
downloads/aboutabortion/medical abortion.pdf.
16.
Lisa B. Haddad & Nawal M. Nour, Unsafe Abortion: Unnecessary Maternal
Mortality, REv. OBSTETRIcs GYNECOLOGY 122, 122-26 (2009).
17.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

18.

See Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.

Control, 317 F.3d 357, 359-71 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding various state abortion
regulations). In his dissent, Judge Robert Bruce King described the effect of abortion
regulations in other states: "[I]n many places, burdensome regulations have made abortions
effectively unavailable, if not technically illegal. It is this type of regulationmicromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop varnish to the location of the
janitors' closets-that is challenged in this case." Id. at 371-72 (King, J., dissenting); see
State Policies in Brief: An Overview ofAbortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 17, 2012),

http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOAL.pdf.

19.

410 U.S. at 125, 153.
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been a "right," it was simply legal in some states and illegal in others. And in states
where it was illegal, abortion was not about rights or medicine. It was about crime
and all that follows from defining an act as criminal: surveillance, prosecution, and
punishment of abortion providers, though interestingly not of the women
themselves (an interesting point to consider).2 o In many ways, abortion is still
about crime even though the procedure itself is no longer criminal. As a matter of
politics, its legality seems ever up for grabs, and abortion is still associated with
crime, as sidewalk protesters (or counselors) plead with abortion patients not to
kill their babies, and as abortion providers are themselves shot and killed.
Abortion is also about other claims to rights. Some of Roe's most
ferocious opponents are defenders of state's rights who contend that the legal
status of abortion should have remained a matter for state legislatures to determine,
not federal courts. 2 ' This view of rights and constitutional structure often links up
with particular theories of constitutional interpretation. Because the word
"abortion" is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution, there has been ongoing
contestation about which (if any) of the provisions or animating values that are in
the text provide the clearest and most hospitable accommodation for a woman's
interest in controlling both her reproductive body and her life. In Roe, the Supreme
Court determined that the right derived from a constellation-a "penumbra" in the
Court's inventive phrase-of several other explicit provisions understood to
protect aspects of privacy.22 This was resisted by those (including four dissenting
justices) who thought the right itself was an invention, unsupported by
constitutional text or precedent. In an influential 1973 article, constitutional law
scholar John Hart Ely put the matter this way: "[Roe] is bad because it is bad
constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no
sense of an obligation to try to be."23
Other scholars, quite secure about the Court's textual authority to
consider criminal abortion statutes, have since suggested that women's right to
reproductive control might also or more satisfactorily have been framed in terms of
sex equality or autonomy or dignity.24 The Court itself has since used the language
of liberty in characterizing the nature of the right. Still others have invoked
freedom of religion and the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on involuntary
servitude. The right to abortion has also been explicated and defended on nonconstitutional bases, such as on human rights grounds and the right to health.25

LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND
20.
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1973, at 168-71 (1997).
21.
MARY ANNE GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 30 (1987).

22.

410 U.S. at 129.

23.

John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82

YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973).
24.
See WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S ToP LEGAL
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack. M. Balkin ed., 2005).

Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right:
25.
Internationaland Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 250 (2008) (observing that

the African Women's Protocol is the only legally binding human rights instrument that
explicitly affirms women's reproductive rights, including abortion, as human rights).
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Doctors too have made rights-based claims about abortion. Some argue
that their right to practice medicine is infringed by statutes that prohibit certain
methods of abortion or that require them to tell their abortion patients that a fetus
is a human being or feels pain. 26 Other doctors argue that they have a conscientious
right not to participate in abortion at all, or as medical students even to learn about
it. 27 Forty-six states have now enacted "conscience clauses," permitting physicians
and other medical professionals, such as nurses and pharmacists, to refuse to
provide or participate in "abortion-related services." 28 In 1996, Congress enacted
the Coats Amendment, protecting training hospitals from losing federal funds if
they chose not to provide abortion training in obstetric residency programs, as
29
otherwise required by the accrediting board for medical schools.
Of course, in addition to women's rights, states' rights, and doctors'
rights, there are vigorous and important claims made on behalf of the fetus that it
too has rights and interests. Indeed, many pro-life supporters would say that
abortion is really only about an embryo or a fetus' right to develop until its natural
birth-its right to life-and that the rest is noise. Whether the fetus has
constitutional rights or moral rights, or any other claim to respect, there is no
question about its centrality in any discussion of abortion in the United States
today. Fetal life, sometimes now just called "life," now competes with-or has
perhaps overtaken-pregnancy as the operative essence of what abortion is about.
And while rejecting the claim that a fetus is a legal person, the Supreme Court has
held that a state may decidedly take the fetus' interests into account in regulating
abortion, and that states may now do so from the moment of conception.3 0
Abortion is also about religion, and for some it is about sin. In the view of
Pope John Paul II, as presented in the 1995 papal encyclical, Evangelium Vitae
(Gospel ofLife), the modern world faces a struggle between a culture of life and a
culture of death. The Culture of Life is defined as "unconditional respect for the
right to life of every innocent person from conception to natural death"; in

See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis
26.
of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 940-44. Caroline Mala Corbin

has made an interesting First Amendment argument on behalf of abortion patients required
to listen to legislative scripts. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REv. 939 (2009); Elizabeth Sepper, Taking
ConscienceSeriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 101(2012).
See State Policies in Brief: Refusing To Provide Health Services,
27.
GUTTMACHER

INST.

(2008),

available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/

spibRPHS.pdf. Federal law also contains provisions allowing medical providers to refuse
to perform abortions on the grounds of conscience. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1973); see also
JODY FEDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21428, THE HISTORY AND EFFECT OF ABORTION

CONSCIENCE CLAUSE LAWS (2005), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/

crsreports/crsdocuments/RS2142801142005.pdf.
See State Policies In Brief Refusing To Provide Health Services, supra note
28.
27.
29.

See Church and Medicine: An Overview, PHYSICIANS FOR REPROD. CHOICE &

HEALTH (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.prch.org/church-and-medicine-an-overview.
30.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992).
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contrast, the Culture of Death is "a veritable structure of sin." 31 This view had
consequences for the temporal world of politics. Pope Benedict XVI, as Bishop
Ratzinger, stated in 2005 that "a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in
evil and so unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion" were he or she to
vote for a candidate because of the candidate's permissive stand on abortion. 32
Accordingly, during the 2008 presidential campaign, the Catholic Bishop of
Boston urged priests to deny Holy Communion to Senator John Kerry for his
support of legal abortion. 33 The Bishop of Colorado extended the ban to "Catholics
who vote for candidates that stand for abortion" explaining that "Catholic
politicians who advocate for abortion . . . place themselves outside of full

communion with the Church and so jeopardize their salvation" and that Catholic
voters may "suffer the same fateful consequences." 34 During the 2012 presidential
campaign, Vice President Joe Biden received a similar warning.35 Of course, not
all religions take this position, though similar teachings (and similar efforts to
persuade parishioners) are found in other denominations. For now, my point is
simply that abortion in the United States is often about religion and its influence.
For others, morality is the key, whether informed by religious or secular
precepts. The legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has put the case in terms of the
sacredness of human life, which, he explained, need not be understood as a
theological category. Other philosophers and ethicists anchor their views in
notions of "dignity," "personhood," or "humanity."
To be sure, moral
propositions are not always advanced in the measured tones of philosophers. A
Mississippi Supreme Court judge put the argument for morality rather differently

31.
POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: ENCYCLICAL LETTER ON THE VALUE
AND INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN LIFE
21, (Mar. 25, 1995), available at http://www.new
advent.org/library/docs jp02ev.htm. "Among all the crimes which can be committed
against life," said the Pope, "procured abortion has characteristics making it, together with
infanticide ... an unspeakable crime." Id. 1 58.
32.
See generally Gregory C. Sisk & Charles J. Reid, Jr., Abortion, Bishops,
Eucharist, and Politicians: A Question of Communion, 43 CATH. LAw. 255 (2004)
(discussing abortion from the perspective of the Catholic Church).
33.
Laurie Goodstein, Bishop Would Deny Ritefor Defiant Catholic Voters, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2004, at Al3; Laurie Goodstein et al., The 2004 Campaign: The Abortion
Issue; Vatican Cardinal Signals Backing for Sanctions on Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, April 24,
2004, at Al3.
34.
Most Reverend Michael J. Sheridan, A Pastoral Letter to the Catholic
Faithful of the Diocese of Colorado Springs on the Duties of Catholic Politicians and Voters
(May 1, 2004), availableat http://www.ewtn.com/library/bishops/capolvot.htm.
35.
Michael Peppard, Paul Ryan, Catholic Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2012,
at A3 1.
36.
See JAMES A. MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 255-56 (2003).
37.
RONALD DwORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 25 (1994).
38.
See generally ABORTION CONTROVERSY: 25 YEARS AFTER ROE VS. WADE, A
READER (Louis Pojman & Francis J. Beckwith eds., 2d ed. 1998); DAVID BOONIN, A
DEFENSE OF ABORTION (2003); THE MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES (John T. Noonan Jr. ed., 1970).
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in a 2001 opinion: "Ever since the abomination known as Roe v. Wade became the
law of the land, the morality of our great nation has slipped ever downwards to the
point that the decision to spare the life of an unborn child has become an arbitrary
decision based on convenience." 39 Of course, it is important to remember that the
invocation of morality does itself tip the scale against a decision to abort.
Depending on the circumstances of the pregnancy, for many women the decision
to have an abortion (or for a doctor to perform one) may itself be regarded as a
moral act.40
But let us return to Mississippi and the judicial characterization of
abortion as an "arbitrary decision based on convenience."4 1 The assessment brings
us to the matter of sex, for whatever else abortion may be about, it is certainly
about sex and sexual culture. Pregnancy is necessarily connected to sex, and
attitudes about sex-with whom, how often, for what purpose-are tucked into
people's views on abortion, and this includes their views on abortion law. Consider
the law's differential treatment of pregnancy depending on what kind of sex
brought it about. In the days when abortion was illegal, many states made an
exception for pregnancies resulting from involuntary sex (rape or incest). But even
now when abortion is legal, these exceptions still have currency. In 2011, 32 states
that as a general matter refuse to pay for the abortions of Medicaid patients will do
so in cases of rape or incest. 4 2
Pregnancy resulting from voluntary sex is another matter, perhaps
especially for teenagers. There is a general consensus that teenagers who get
pregnant have been a bit too frisky for their own good and should not be able to
have an abortion ("an arbitrary decision based on convenience," in the judge's
words) just because they want one.43 In contrast to other places (all of Western
Europe, say) where teenage sexuality is accepted as developmentally normal,
teenage sex in the United States is more often taken as a sign of trouble.44 Despite
our highly sexualized culture, teenage girls aren't really supposed to "do it." They
are supposed to be the kind of daughters their parents imagine them to be. This
explains why sex education and contraceptive preparedness have been regarded as
provocative rather than prudent behavior. It also explains the popularity of the
parental involvement statutes now in place in more than 30 states. These are laws
that require a pregnant minor either to notify or get consent from one or both
parents (different states have different schemes) before she can consent to an
abortion. If the parents are unwilling to do so, the minor must then petition her
local court for permission and participate in what is known as a "judicial by-pass

39.
concurring).
40.
41.
42.

R.B. v. Mississippi, 790 So. 2d 830, 835-36 (Miss. 2001) (Easley, J.,
Sepper, supra note 26, at 105, 124.
R.B., 790 So. 2d at 836 (Easley, J, concurring).
See State Policies in Brief State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid,
(Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib

GUTTMACHER INST.

SFAM.pdf.
43.
R.B., 790 So. 2d at 836 (Easley, J., concurring).
44.
See Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the UnitedStates: Politics
and Policy, 18 INT. J.L. Po'Y & FAM. 305, 313 (2004).
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hearing."45 In these hearings, a judge takes evidence to assess whether or not the
minor is mature enough to decide about abortion. If the judge decides the minor is
not sufficiently mature, he must in the first instance reject her petition. (Yes, this
means the immature minor now proceeds on to motherhood.) The statutes reveal
concerns not only about teen sex and abortion but also anxieties about family
structure and parental authority.
Parental involvement statutes further illustrate that abortion is also, and
ferociously, about legislative lawmaking. Since Roe was decided in 1973, state
legislatures have enacted thousands of statutes regulating abortion provision,
procedures, and practice, and thousands more are on the way.4 6 Abortion is also
increasingly the subject of the more populist lawmaking process, or what is
sometimes called "direct democracy," as personhood amendments and other
abortion-related measures have begun to appear more regularly on state ballot
measures. 4 7 In November 2008 alone, the voters in South Dakota, Colorado, and
California were respectively called upon to decide whether all abortions should be
banned, whether the word "person" should be defined as starting at conception,
and whether parental notification is a good idea.48 In 2011, Mississippi rejected a
personhood amendment. 4 9 All this voting, by legislators and by citizens, shows
familiarity with and acceptance of abortion as an inherently political subject, one
whose legal status remains unsettled as a matter of politics, if not a matter of
constitutional law, subject to ongoing supervision and near perpetual review.
Of course, that abortion is about politics is hard to miss in the United
States, where office-seekers from school board members all the way up regularly
campaign as being in support of or in opposition to (nearly all are in opposition)
legal abortion. The political nature of abortion is quite distinctive when compared
to other countries. In the United States, abortion has become not only a political
issue, but a partisan one. To be a Republican, at least in recent years, means that
your party officially opposes a woman's right to choose abortion; being a
Democrat means your party supports that right.5 0 As historian Jill Lepore observes,
this means that abortion and abortion-related issues, such as federal funding for

45.
See Carol Sanger, DecisionalDignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings,
and the Misuse ofLaw, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 417-18 (2009) [hereinafter Sanger,
DecisionalDignity].

46.

The exact number introduced between January 1, 2011 and April 21, 2011

was 916. See State Legislative Trends: Hostility to Abortion Rights Increases, GUTTMACHER
INsT.

(April 12, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2011/04/12/index.html.

For a detailed analysis, see Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: Trends in the
First Quarterof 2011, GUTTMACHER INST. (2011), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
updates/201 1/statetrends 12011 .html.
47.
Sanger, DecisionalDignity, at 412-13.
48.
Id.
49.
Katharine Q. Seelye, Voters Defeat Many G.O.P.-SponsoredMeasures, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A20.
50.
Jill Lepore, Birthright: What's Next for PlannedParenthood,NEW YORKER,
Nov 14. 2011. Lepore notes that abortion was not always a partisan issue. In 1972, polls
showed that a majority of Republicans and Democrats agreed with the proposition that a
decision about abortion should be left to the pregnant woman and her doctor. Id.
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Planned Parenthood, now sink or swim legislatively depending on voters' views on
party issues that have nothing to do with abortion, such as economic policy.s1 In
contrast, in England, party affiliation does not determine a politician's position on
abortion: one can be a Tory and support reproductive rights; one can be a Liberal
and oppose them.
Abortion is not only a matter of legislative politics. In states that elect the
judiciary, judges also run on the issue. Nothing could be clearer than the campaign
slogan for a Kentucky district judgeship: "Jed Deters is a Pro-Life Candidate." 52
Mr. Deters lost the contest, but was censured by the state Judicial Commission for
making campaign statements that "committed or appeared to commit" him with
respect to issues likely to come before the court, a violation of the rules of judicial
ethics.53 In upholding Deters' censure, the Kentucky Supreme Court expressed "no
doubt" that Deters had intended to commit himself on pro-life issues: He had
"freely testified that 'any good Catholic is pro-life,' that Kenyon County has a high
percentage of Catholic voters, and that his statement .

.

. would 'hopefully' give

him a 'distinct edge in the race,' since 'you're in it to win. You do what it
takes."' 54 The case begins to give us a practical sense of the nature and scope of
abortion realpolitik. Whatever one's moral or religious views on abortion, there is
also the strategic use of the topic if one is "in it to win."
In addition to the particularities of electoral politics, abortion is also about
a more general dimension of civic life, and that is national identity. We are perhaps
more able to see this when looking outside our own borders. Ireland and Poland
provide two good examples. Ireland's restrictive abortion law-abortion is illegal
although women are now permitted to travel abroad to obtain a legal abortion-is
deeply connected to Irish identity.55 This identity, what one scholar has called "a
particularly gendered nationalism," draws from defining aspects of Irish culture:
Catholicism, patriarchal family structure, and moral absolutism. Liberalization of
abortion law would undermine not only each of these values individually but also
their sum-Irishness. In Poland, abortion reform (the return to strict regulation) in
the post-socialist era has been understood not to undermine but to reinstate Polish

Id.
Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 201-03 (Ky.
1994). I note that in 2002, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the United States
51.
52.

Supreme Court invalidated a Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct provision prohibiting
judicial candidates from "announcing" their views on disputed legal and political issues.
536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that that the prohibition violated
the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates. Id. Although it is unclear if White, which
dealt with an "announce" clause, necessarily invalidates "commit clauses," that were at
issue in the Deters case, it seems quite clear that judicial candidates after White are freer to
express their views-if not their commitment regarding future cases-on the matter of

abortion. Id. at 765.
Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 202.
Id. at 201-03.
See LISA SMYTH, ABORTION
CONTEMPORARY IRELAND 9 (2005).
56.
Id. at 33.
53.
54.
55.
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values. As political scientist Katherine Verdery has explained, the politics of
abortion has "agitated nearly all post-socialist countries, as pro-natalist nationalists
strive for demographic renewal of their nations following what they see as
socialism's 'murderous' abortion policies."58
Is there a relation between abortion and national identity in the United
States? We are, of course, a complex country (who isn't?) and other than rooting
for our team on fields of friendly and sometimes not so friendly strife, there may
be no one American view on anything. Yet, in trying to understand what abortion
is about, it is worth pondering the relation between abortion and national identity,
or the values that underlie a claimed national identity. There is not time here to
fully pursue this aspect of "aboutness," but there are promising leads. For example,
political scientist James Morone has argued that we are at core a "hellfire
nation." 59
But putting the matter of national character aside, there are also more
intimate ways to characterize what abortion is about, for it is rarely only a matter
of politics and policies. Abortion is a deeply personal decision that more than a
million American women make each year as each confronts a pregnancy that is or
has become unwanted. These numbers are meaningful. Almost a third of all
women in the United States will have an abortion at some point in their
reproductive lives-that 30-year stretch in which pregnancy is possible over and
over and over again.6 0 The number of women who have thought about abortion is
likely much, much larger: Four million women in the United States have babies
each year, and surely some of them will have considered doing otherwise. Even
Sarah Palin, pregnant with her fifth child at age 44, acknowledged the "fleeting
thought:" "I'm out of town. No one knows I'm pregnant. No one would ever have
to know."61
Abortion is therefore about all the things women consider as they assess
the place of a child and the meaning of motherhood in their lives at a particular
moment in time. These include a woman's faith, her finances, and her plans and
aspirations for the future.62 They also often include an assessment of her
relationships with and obligations to existing (or non-existing) partners, as well as
relations with and obligations to the children she already has; after all, more than a
third of all women who terminate a pregnancy are mothers already. Thus, abortion
is not only about abstract conceptions of motherhood, as an imagined pregnancy
sometimes is. It is an unflinchingly concrete decision about intimate relations and

57.
See generally Andrzej Kulczycki, Abortion Policy in Postcommunist Europe:
The Conflict in Poland,21 POPULATION & DEV. REv. 471 (1995).
KATHERINE VERDERY, THE POLITICAL LIVES OF DEAD BODIES: REBURIAL AND
58.
POSTSOCIALIST CHANGE 36 (1999).
59.
MORONE, supra note 35, at 3.
60.
Facts on Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTrMACHER INST.
(Jan. 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html.
61.

SARAH PALIN, GOING ROGUE: AN AMERICAN LIFE 171-72 (2009).

Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative
and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 117-18
62.

(2005).
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family composition-how many children there are to be and whether a particular
man is to become a father (and perhaps a husband or partner as well). And it is
about the impact of all of this on her life now and the shape of her life in the
future.
Because we are talking here mostly about women's lives, abortion is also
necessarily about gender. It is about gender both in terms of who ultimately gets to
decide (she does) and how and with whom her decision and its consequences are
negotiated (often a more complicated matter). She gets to decide not only because
it is her pregnant body right now, but also because of the profound significance of
motherhood for women over time. As the Supreme Court soberly observed in Roe:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future..

. . Mental

and physical health may be

taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it.63
Although the Court does not use the word gender in explaining the relationship
between motherhood and profound distress, it offers the classic example of the
gendered order of social life: the assignment of childcare, or more broadly childraising, to women.
To be sure, many citizens believe or are invested in this traditional set-up,
a seemingly natural scheme where men (if no longer quite hunters) and women (no
longer quite hearth-bound gatherers) nonetheless occupy distinctive and for some,
appropriate roles. For those who feel anxious about the stability of this once
durable boy-girl arrangement, abortion is likely to be deeply unsettling, for control
over reproduction-consenting to sex, using contraception, deciding about control
over abortion-is everything. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the
economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives."" Although this is surely an accurate description,
not everyone agrees with women's equal participation.
Another way to frame the matter is to consider abortion's relation to
power. The right to decide about abortion gives women significant authority over
their lives, at least with regard to motherhood. That same authority also has the
power to create obligations for others. I have in mind the men who will now
become fathers; more on men in a moment. But the authority vested in women has
an even grander and more profound sweep. Anthropologist Rayna Rapp observes
that deciding about abortion "forces each woman to act as a moral
philosopher. . . , adjudicating the standards guarding entry into the human
,,65
Rapp's work
community for which she serves as normalizing gatekeeper.

63.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).

64.
65.

505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).

RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 131 (1999).
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focuses on abortion decisions occasioned by the diagnosis of fetal disability, but
her point holds more generally. Control over whether a new person comes into
being-the gatekeepingof human existence-is powerful stuff indeed.

In thinking about gender and abortion, it is of course important to
consider the role and responses of men. For example, a new man-based ground of
opposition to abortion known as male post-abortion trauma has recently been
introduced into the public discussion. But as an empirical matter (in contrast to
an anecdotal one), we do not know much about men's preferences with regard to
pregnancies they have brought about. To be sure, in Casey, the Supreme Court
accepted that husbands, or enough of them, if notified beforehand about their
wife's intent to seek an abortion, might well use physical or mental coercion to
prevent her from acting. Spousal notification laws are one of the few examples in
the last 20 years where the Court has found a statute operated to create a
"substantial obstacle" to a woman exercising her rights under Roe. It makes sense
then that pregnant women in abusive relationships are least likely to inform a
partner about the pregnancy or a subsequent abortion.6 7 But absent domestic
violence, it appears that male partners generally go along with whatever decision
the woman makes, although certainly there are cases where men want the woman
to abort and are frustrated by their legal inability to require that. Thus, although
state legislatures seem to assume that men would dissuade (or otherwise block) a
woman from obtaining an abortion, we really don't know what outcome most men
prefer.
However, in thinking about the relationship between men and abortion, I
am at present less interested in men's responses to a woman's abortion than in
what we know about how men might make abortion decisions themselves. That is,
what factors would men consider in figuring out what to do about impending and
unwanted fatherhoodwere the matter under their control? In posing the question, I
am not asking what would men do if they actually became pregnant. My thought is
that in that case, men would have become women, and we might well be exactly
where we are today except with women on top of the heap instead of someplace
lower down.
One way- to get at the question of what men might do is to look at what
they have done in circumstances where they have had legal authority over some
form of prenatal life. I have in mind the small trove of frozen embryo cases. These
are cases in which couples have mutually created and stored embryos for future
use but have since broken up and now only one of the pair wants to proceed with
implantation.6 8 Because there has been no implantation, there is no pregnancy. Yet

66.

See, e.g., C.T. Coyle, Post Abortion Trauma in Men Still Overlooked,

http://www.fatherhoodforever.orglarticles/post-abortion-trauma-inmen-still-overlooked (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). But see Nada L. Stotland, The Myth ofMale
FATHERHOOD FOREVER,

Abortion Trauma, 268 J.AM. MED. Ass'N 2078-79 (1992).
67.
Rachel K. Jones et al., Perceptionsof Male Knowledge and Support Among
U.S. Women ObtainingAbortions, 21 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 117, 117-23 (2011).
68.
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992) (based on his own

childhood experience in a children's home, former husband did not want any potential
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there are at least the raw materials and something approaching pregnancy. The
frozen embryo cases are about as close as we may presently come to
approximating an abortion decision for men.
Are the things that matter to men in deciding about parenthood so very
different from the things that matter to women? If, as some of the frozen embryo
cases suggest, the calculations by men and women turn out to be similar-concern
over the potential child's future welfare, 69 distress over an ongoing relationship
with the other parent, 70 an unwillingness to consider adoption as an acceptable
alternative7 -then we might untether abortion from the deeply gendered anchor of
motherhood and consider, if only for a moment, what abortion regulation would
look like if its subjects were men. One suspects that it would not look quite the
same as it does now, with assumptions of incompetence, layers of secondguessing, and invasive counseling. The sort of complicated and self-regarding
analysis that women engage in when deciding what to do in the face of an
unwanted pregnancy might be less often dismissed as mistaken, ill-informed, or
too hasty were men's lives on the line in the same way that unhappily pregnant
women perceive theirs to be.
In this regard, as the Supreme Court itself has suggested, the availability
of legal abortion sits as a kind of cosmic wallpaper against which other sorts of
decisions-about jobs, about relationships-are made all the time, and by men as
well as women. In 1992, the Court had occasion to reconsider its decision in Roe
in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey. In that case, as part of its stare decisis analysis,
the Court assessed the societal impact of Roe, concluding that "for two decades of
economic and social developments, people have organized their intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail."" In Casey, the Court decided not to overrule Roe in
large part because so many people had "ordered their thinking and living around
that case." 73 It is time then to join the Court in taking "judicial notice" of the
accepted relation between abortion law and how ordinary reproductive people are
able to go about their daily lives.
Each of these characterizations of what abortion is about-medicine,
religion, law, politics, sexual culture, the organization of intimate relationships, the
shape of a woman's life, and national identity-provokes its own set of anxieties
and controversies. Within medical schools, there are debates about whether

children raised without a father and a mother); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 43 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2006) (former husband could not imagine an ongoing relationship with his former
wife, as the existence of children would necessarily produce).
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
69.
Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 40-43.
70.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
71.
Planned Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
72.
(1992).
Id. ("The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance
73.
on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people
who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.").
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abortion should be a required subject or an optional one.74 Within law, parties
argue about how to square a woman's right to choose an abortion with the First
Amendment rights of sidewalk protestors urging her not to. 75 Within religion and
moral philosophy, theologians and scholars worry that the language of dignity may
be poisoned or consecrated by the abortion debate.
Things get even more complicated and often more contentious when
conceptions of abortion from one sphere or discipline bump into those from
another. These collisions happen all the time and in kaleidoscopic combinations:
rights and religion, medicine and morality, commerce and culture, legislatures and
courts, gender and law, politics and everything. The slow and convoluted approval
process by the Food and Drug Administration of the morning-after pill Plan B
illustrates again the tumble of disciplinary factors-commercial, scientific, and
political-that distinguish the treatment of abortion, here within the administrative
state.7 7 As June Carbone and Naomi Kahn explain, the administrative controversy
over Plan B demonstrated "the conflagration of the anti-abortion religious stancethe mere possibility that the drug might make implantation in the uterine wall less
likely is enough for some opponents to label it 'abortion'-with the determination
to bring back pregnancy as the penalty for improvident sex." 78 The examples
highlight again how abortion is rarely only about one thing. Rather, individual
preferences, private and public conceptions of morality, and political maneuvering
swirl around one another in a perfect storm of contention.
Because the classification of abortion as one kind of issue or another
matters in how abortion is viewed-how the issues are framed, who gets to weigh
in, the available scope of action-the integrity of the categories is important. I
don't mean that the contours of any particular category are fixed in meaning but
rather that before advocates are able to draw upon the full range of structural,
social, or doctrinal advantages of a particular category, there ought to be some
degree of assurance that the categorization is accurate, that there is "fit."

74.
See Angel M. Foster et al., Educationaland Legislative InitiativesAffecting
Residency Training in Abortion, 290 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1777, 1777 (2003); see also supra

note 27.
75.
Another example is abortion clinic protestors who claim that the First
Amendment gives them the right to be seen by patients and others entering the clinics. In
these cases, however, the relevant sensation might be hearing rather than sight. In Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), Justice Stevens framed the discussion around statutory

protections of "the unwilling listener." Id. at 708. For the argument that mandated abortion
counsel impermissibly intrudes upon a woman's right to be free from compelled listening,
see Corbin, supra note 26.
76.
See generally Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHILOSOPHY 251 (1976); Michael J.
Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control,99 ETHics 520 (1989).
77.
See NAOMI KAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES v. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 180-84 (2009).
78.
Id. at 182.
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Consider the distinction between abortion as a medical issue and what we
might call the "medicalization of abortion." 79 I use that term to mean treating nonmedical aspects of abortion as though they were in fact medical in order to gain the
regulatory benefits of the category. We see this in the transformation in some
states of the familiar concept of medically informed consent into something closer
to what I have called "morally informed consent;" the requirement that pregnant
women be told that human life begins at conception is a good example. 0 This is
not to say that women may not take their conceptions of life (or anything else) into
account when deciding what to do. My point is only that they should be able to do
so as a matter of individual conscience and not as the result of pressure from the
state in the name of regulating anything so long as it is called medical.
This is all to say then that as we know from daily life in the United States,
abortion is all about us, fervently contested throughout the culture as citizens try to
persuade one another to recognize or reconsider what abortion is really about and
to incorporate that better view into their own beliefs and behaviors.

II. THE VISUALITY OF ABORTION
Controversies about abortion in the United States are not hard to miss.
We hear about them on talk radio, from the pulpit, in Congress and statehouses, on
the campaign trail, and from news sources of all kinds. But in addition to all this
talk, abortion's unmissability in American culture also has a powerful visual
component, and this too influences how Americans have come to think about
abortion. The signs and symbols associated with abortion occupy real, physical
space, and in this sense too, abortion is "about" us visually in everyday sorts of
ways.

Depending on one's neighborhood or route home, one sees billboards
celebrating fetal life or suggesting adoption as an alternative. Drivers stuck in
traffic can read bumper stickers on the car in front: "I'm a Child not a Choice"
from one perspective; "Mind Your Own Uterus" from the other. 82 There are
"Choose Life" license plates and special pro-life billboard-trucks that trawl the
highways displaying aborted fetal parts.83 City dwellers, more likely to pass

See ELLIE LEE, ABORTION, MOTHERHOOD, AND MENTAL HEALTH:
79.
MEDICALIZING REPRODUCTION INTHE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN (2003).
Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasoundand the Path to
80.
a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REv. 351, 397-403 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and
Believing].
81.
Graphic Anti-Abortion Billboard Disturbs Orlando Residents, WFTV.coM

(May 11, 2005, 5:13 PM), http://www.wftv.com/news/4478170/detail.html (reporting on
neighborhood distress caused after a Center for Bio-Ethical Reform ("CBR") poster of a
"fetus, torn into pieces and covered in blood" was displayed on a residential street).
82.
Peggy Hau, The Politics of Law, Language, & Morality: Thucydides & the
Abortion Debate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 711, 736 (1999) (discussing "Abortion Stops a

Beating Heart" bumper stickers).
83.
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 605, 641-44 (2008) (discussing the legality of states'
issuances of controversially themed license places).
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newsstands than billboards, find their abortion cues in magazine headlines-Sarah
and Bristol Palin holding their babies on the cover of In Touch magazine ("We're
Glad We Chose Life"),84or on public transportation. Subway cars in New York and
buses in St. Louis display placards from the anti-abortion "Abortion Changes You"
ad campaign ("A grandchild is missing"). Some people wear tiny fetal feet lapel
pins; others, on occasion, don "I Had an Abortion" T-shirts.
In addition to displays that are deliberately positional, abortion visuals
also take a less argumentative form. I have in mind the ordinary but pervasive
presence of fetal imagery throughout the culture, at rallies, yes, but also in
advertisements ("Is Something Inside Telling You to Buy a Volvo?");87 on postage
stamps; 88 and significantly, on colleague's desks nestled among other family
photographs. Ultrasound scans grace shower invitations, refrigerator magnets, and
pregnancy journal webpages as happily expectant women and their families
displa the cuteness that is to come, or for some, the personality who is already
here. Babies too are sometimes part of abortion's visual presence. Think of the
sleeping Palin baby lovingly and quite publically passed among the candidates'
families during his mother's acceptance speech at the 2008 Republican National
Convention.90
In sum, we are used to seeing images of fetuses-generic and particular,
frightening and friendly-and part of the abortion story I want to tell concerns the
relation of this familiar imagery to abortion regulation. The visual aspect of

84.

In Touch Exclusive Interview & Photos: Sarah & Bristol Palin, "We're Glad

We Chose Life," IN TOUCH (Jan. 13, 2010 10:21 PM), http://www.intouchweekly.com/
entertainment/news/touch-exclusive-interview-photossarah-bristol-palin-were-glad-we-
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85.
ABORTION CHANGES You, http://www.abortionchangesyou.com/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012).
86.
1 HAD AN ABORTION (A film by Gillian Aldrich and Jennifer Baumgardner
2005); JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER, ABORTION & LIFE (2008).
87.
Janetle Sue Taylor, The Public Fetus and the Family Car: From Abortion
Politics to a Volvo Advertisement, 4 PUB. CULTURE 67, 67 (1992).
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Margaret B. McNay & John E.E. Fleming, Forty Years of Obstetric

Ultrasound 1957-1997: From A-Scope to Three Dimensions, 25 ULTRASOUND MED. &
BIOLOGY 3, 50 fig.43 (1999).
See generally LISA M. MITCHELL, BABY'S FIRST PICTURE: ULTRASOUND AND
89.
THE POLITICS OF FETAL SUBJECTS 3 (2001) (discussing how a trip to the sonographer has
become "[o]ne of the most common rituals of pregnancy").
90.
There are also more subtle (perhaps subconscious) baby-killing-related
messages. I have in mind the "Don't Abandon Your Baby" posters that were an essential
part of the Safe Haven campaigns discussed earlier. Designed to discourage women who
were hiding their pregnancies from killing their newborns at birth-the much publicized
"dumpster babies"-the posters and other Safe Haven publicity also underscored social
conceptions of how wickedly some women behave toward babies and, by implication, to
fetuses too. The dissemination of Safe Haven messages about the dangerousness of
pregnant women, about what they are capable of doing, is one example of how issues
become abortion-inflected. In the Safe Haven case, the connection was direct; much of the
legislation was proudly and publically sponsored by state right to life organizations. Sanger,
Infant Safe Haven Laws, supranote 3.
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abortion is rarely analyzed as a matter of law, yet seeing (or what one court has
called "sensory and contemporaneous observance") 9' is now an important feature
in how abortion is understood and how it is regulated. Of course, if seeing
something is understood to make the thing observed more reliable, more true, and
more real, then we should expect the law to take fetal imagery into account, as it
has begun to do as part of what we might think of as "the visuality of law." The
law has considered the significance of fetal imagery not only with regard to
mandatory ultrasound statutes, but in other areas not usually associated with
reproductive rights. These include criminal sentencing (are fetal photos
prejudicial?),92 employment worker's rights (may fetal scan badges be worn at
work?), 9 3 and prison discipline (are fetal pictures "fighting words"?). 94 Fetal life
and fetal looks are now part of American life. Visual politics has combined with
visual technology, and the law has seized upon both in a campaign to encourage
women to choose against abortion.
It is important, however, not simply to accept that fetal imagery works as
lawmakers expect it to (woman seeking abortion sees fetus, woman changes
mind). This cuts in both directions. A recent Canadian study shows that women
who chose to look at a fetal scan before an abortion under a completely voluntary
scheme did not change their minds about the procedure after looking. Moreover,
sometimes the information imparted by an ultrasound is the very thing that makes
a woman decide against proceeding with what may have been a much wanted

Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
91.
See Erazo v. State, 167 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that
92.
admission of a fetal photograph was likely to appeal to the jury's emotions and therefore
harmful error). But see People v. Rios, No. G031541, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6026
(Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 24, 2004) (upholding the inclusion of graphic photos of a bloody
stillborn fetus in a rape prosecution of the father of a fetus where the probative value of the
photos outweighed the danger of undue prejudice); Rogers v. State, Nos. 05-05-00283-CR,
05-05-00284-CR, 2006 WL 475795 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2006) (upholding the trial
court's admission into evidence of autopsy photographs of a uterus removed from the
victim's body, placenta, and an eight-to-nine-week-old fetus as relevant to issue of whether
the fetus was alive at the time the victim was shot); Hicks v. Commonwealth, No. 0430-064, 2007 WL 1244558 (Va. Ct. App. May 1, 2007) (holding that the autopsy photographs of
the deceased victim's fetus as relevant to proving an element of the offense).
93.
Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
94.
Wishnatsky v. Schuetzle, No. 97-1130, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5966 (8th
Cir. Mar. 27, 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a prisoner had not met his burden of
demonstrating that the warden's policy was not reasonably related to penological interest in
security). The warden of North Dakota State Penitentiary instituted an "aborted fetus
policy" prohibiting prisoners from possessing pictures of aborted fetuses after the display of
such pictures provoked verbal and physical confrontations among prisoners. Id. at *2. A
prisoner objected to the policy on First Amendment grounds after prison officials screened
his mail for "postcards of unborn children, both alive in the womb and dead through
abortion." Id. CBR offers e-cards of bloody aborted fetuses which website visitors can email
as they like. See Ecards, CENTER FOR BIO-ETHICAL REFORM, http://www.abortionno.org/
Resources/ecards.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
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pregnancy. 95 Some pregnancies become unwanted precisely because an ultrasound
scan reveals one or another fetal anomaly or disqualifying characteristic.
We might then ask: If looking is shown not to be a determinant in an
abortion, what function it does serve?

III. TALKING ABOUT ABORTION
Abortion is not an easy subject to talk about. This is so at the level of
lawmaking, as well as in more personal realms-among friends, within families,
and between partners. Thus, although abortion has been the subject of loud public
debate for some 40 years, at these other levels of discourse the subject remains
decidedly muted. The difficulties of discussion have connected and reinforcing
causes. There is, for starters, the provocative problem of basic vocabulary:
Termination of pregnancy or abortion? Pro-life or anti-choice? Fetus or unborn
child? Pregnant woman or mother? The choice is not only a matter of political or
philosophical outlook, but often one of context. Few people-including, I suspect,
few pro-choice people-when handed an ultrasound scan by an eager friend or
cousin are likely to offer congratulations on the friend'sfetus. To do so isn't in the
spirit of the moment; it misses the sense of occasion when news of a wanted
pregnancy is shared.
On the other hand, the distinction between "fetus" and "child" is crucial
when either word is used in a statute, particularly in association with or in
substitution for the other. Consider, for example, the inclusion of embryos and
fetuses under the definition of "child" in federally funded insurance programs.96
Throughout the lawmaking process, political objectives and understandings
govern, not social ones. Sometimes the use of the term is negotiated, as we saw
when proponents of Missing Angel Acts accepted the word "fetus" in place of
"child" as part of a compromise in the drafting of stillborn birth certificate
legislation.9

To be sure, prenatal life is not always referred to in just one way
(embryo) or the other (child), even by the same people or regarding the same
pregnancy. The vocabulary of reproduction often progresses in stages. Couples
move into the language of "baby" as a pregnancy develops, provided that the
pregnancy is coming along well. In contrast, couples undergoing prenatal
diagnostic testing not uncommonly distance themselves from the language of
"baby" until they have received the final results and have decided whether or not
to continue the pregnancy.98 This kind of linguistic and conceptual distancing is
not uncommon in other pregnancies that are or that have become unwanted.

95.
See Kenneth B. Schechtman et al., Decision-Makingfor Termination of
Pregnancieswith Fetal Anomalies: Analysis of 53,000 Pregnancies, 99 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 216, 217 tbl.1 (2002).
96.
42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2012) (defining "child," for purposes of federally funded
state insurance programs, to include "an individual under the age of 19 including the period
from conception to birth").
97.
98.

See Sanger, "The Birth ofDeath, " supra note 9, at 306-08.
RAPP, supra note 63.
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Another reason that abortion may not be much talked about at a personal
level is that it remains a private matter, a woman's alone to reveal or discuss.
Privacy not only underlies the right, but in a more social sense, it underlies the
practice as well. One reason is abortion's intense physicality. Whatever else
abortion may be-sin or blessing, impossibility or necessity, a source of sadness or
a source of relief-it is also a matter of the body-real, intimate, and physicaland for this reason alone it may not be the stuff of common or casual conversation.
As anthropologist Rosanne Cecil has observed with regard to other forms of
pregnancy loss, such as miscarriages, "pregnancy loss is frequently accompanied
by a considerable amount of physical pain, blood, and mess," and this too explains
why the subject goes undiscussed.99
In addition to abortion's bodily aspect, women are also reluctant to talk
about abortion because the costs of doing so are perceived, often reasonably, as
high. As the Supreme Court recognized in Casey, some pregnant women fear
physical restraint or punishment from belligerent husbands; this concern anchored
the Court's holding that Pennsylvania's spousal notification created a "substantial
obstacle" to obtaining an abortion and was therefore unconstitutional.100
Talking about abortion also puts women at reputationalrisk. Is it possible
to imagine an American woman politician (or professor or dinner guest or
employee) mentioning that she had an abortion at some point in her life? (It is, I
suspect, the revelation that will do women politicians in, rather as affairs
sometimes do for men.) In recent years, perhaps particularly among the young,
having an abortion is taken as an indication of bad character, though whether for
its revelation of sexual activity, of reproductive unpreparedness, or of basic
immorality, I am not sure.1fo Even among women who terminate a pregnancy
following an unwelcome prenatal diagnosis, there appears to be hierarchies of
acceptable reasons and language. As Ayelet Waldman discovered when she joined
the online abortion support group Heartbreaking Choices, her willingness to
describe her abortion as an abortion was not well-received by others in the support
group who wanted to distinguish the termination of wanted pregnancies from
other, seemingly more casual abortions.102 As one abortion provider explained to
me, patients tend to agree on only three acceptable reasons for an abortion: "rape,
incest, and mine." 10 3 There seems then to be less sympathy or solidarity even
among women who have chosen abortion than one might expect.

99.
Rosanne Cecil, Introduction to THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF PREGNANCY Loss:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN MISCARRIAGE, STILLBIRTH AND NEONATAL DEATH 2 (Rosanne
Cecil ed., 1996).
100.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
893-94 (1992).
101.
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See Susan Dominus, The Mysterious Disappearanceof Pro-Choice Women,
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about as compelling.").
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AYELET

WALDMAN, BAD MOTHER: A CHRONICLE OF MATERNAL CRIMES,
MINOR CALAMITIES, AND OCCASIONAL MOMENTS OF GRACE (2009).
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Private Conversation with an abortion provider (2012).
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So far, I have characterized the reticence around abortion talk as a matter
of privacy. But I want now to distinguish abortion privacy from what I call
"abortion secrecy." The two-privacy and secrecy-certainly have strong
resemblances: both describe methods of control over who gets to know what. Yet,
while both are forms of concealment, they are not quite the same. We might think
of privacy as the right to keep something to one's self (whether as a matter of law,
tradition, custom, or even etiquette). If something is private, the person may
divulge or not, and most of us would not want it otherwise. In contrast, I want to
consider secrecy as a decision to keep things to oneself for fear of the
consequences of doing otherwise. On this understanding, privacy is a source of
power, while secrecy appears to be a more ominous and isolating phenomenon.104
Keeping something secret because one has to is something different. To be sure,
privacy is a means of keeping something secret. But it is the idea that one must
invoke privacy to prevent harm that trips us into the need for secrecy, rather than
the preference for privacy. Consider Judge Richard Posner's refusal to release even
the redacted medical records of late-term abortion patients on the grounds that
"skillful 'Googlers"' might be able to "put two and two together, 'out'
the ... women, and thereby expose them to threats, humiliation, and obloquy."' 0 5
My suggestion is that the need for secrecy underlies women's inability to
talk about abortion and that has a price; just as in the not so distant past, the
inability to talk about breast cancer or infertility or depression had a price. This is
so not only in terms of the psychological relief and the comfort of companionship
that talking sometimes provides, but also with regard to women's physical and
mental health. As a United Nations Special Rapporteur reported in 2011, criminal
abortion laws and "other legal restrictions" that affect women's access to abortion
create a "vicious cycle": "Criminalization . . . results in women seeking
clandestine, and likely unsafe, abortions. The stigma resulting from procuring an
illegal abortion . . . perpetuates the notion that abortion is an immoral
practice . . . , which then reinforces continuing criminalization of the practice."l 06

Even where abortion is legal, the problem endures. As the Fourth Circuit stated in
a 2002 case involving the confidentiality of medical records sought by the state:
"[W]omen seeking abortions in South Carolina have a great deal more to fear than
stigma. The protests designed to harass and intimidate women from entering
abortion clinics, and the violence inflicted on abortion providers, provide women
with ample reason to fear for their physical safety."' 0 7

See Alice Clapman, Privacy Rights and Abortion Outing: A Proposalfor
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Using Common Law Torts to Protect Abortion Patients and Staff, 112 YALE L.J. 1545

(2003) (describing surveillance techniques of anti-abortion advocates).
N.W. Mem'l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2004).
105.
Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Right of Everyone to
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Aug. 2011) (by Anand Grover), available at http://www.acpd.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/
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107.

Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
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The silence around abortion has implications not only for women,
pregnant or not, but for all citizens with regard to the quality of lawmaking. As
with other topics that in the past have dared not speak their name, we cannot act or
regulate without a more thorough sense of the subject. It is hard to imagine, for
example, the possibility of same-sex marriage, or even any discussion of it, when
the word "homosexual" was itself unutterable and the word "gay" meant only
cheerful. Talking more openly about abortion is particularly important now when
regulation is often premised on the view that it is abortion and its supposed
aftermath that harms women, rather than the regulation itself.
At present, public discussion about abortion is too often incomplete or
coded and proceeds with an aura of mistrust about the choice and meaning of
words. Certainly there have been fair grounds for mistrust. "Pregnancy Crisis
Centers," listed in the Yellow Pages under "Abortion Services," turn out to be prolife counseling agencies that arrange adoptions, not abortions. os (The problem is
not the mission but its labeling.) Statutes are given politically purposeful titles that
do not capture all of what they are about, or that do so in the spirit of George
Orwell's 1984. Alabama's mandatory ultrasound statute is called The Woman's
Right to Know Act;109 a Maryland ballot initiative liberalizing that state's abortion
laws was challenged on the grounds that its title ("Abortion Revisions")
intentionally misled voters.'' 0 (The challenge was upheld and then reversed.)"'
Our interest here, of course, is less the title of any statute-although it is
impossible not to appreciate the rhetorical brilliance of the Unborn Child Pain
Prevention Act' 2-than its content: the ways and means by which lawmakers
regulate abortion providers and patients. But citizens are not just the subjects of
law, they are also supposed to make law, directly or indirectly, and we cannot
advance how we think about something-and certainly not how we should
regulate it-until we start to talk about it. 113

IV. TALKING ANEW
What then might a public conversation about abortion look like if the
collective we took a deep breath, dusted ourselves off, and considered anew the
values and topics that constitute "talking about abortion"? I am not quite talking
about consciousness-raising, though there are worse ideas. If a third of all
American women will have had an abortion by age 45, everyone must know
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See Mother & Unborn Baby Care v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Ct. App.
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Woman's Right to Know Act, ALA. CODE § 26-23A-1 (2012).
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110.
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111.
112.
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005), 151 Cong.
Rec. S512 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2005).
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113.
that preceded the 1967 Abortion Reform Act in the United Kingdom. See the second
reading of the debate on the enactment of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act at 732
Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) (1966) 1067, 1067-1166; see also Jeremy Waldron, Legislating
with Integrity, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 373 (2003).
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someone who has. Yet I suspect that lots of people, perhaps mostly men, don't
think that they do and are therefore able to distance themselves from the
phenomenon in any personal way. Nor is my aim some sort of cheerful gesture
toward compromise. I doubt there is some kind of harmonic convergence hovering
above ready to sort out the abortion issue if we all just listened more carefully.
Nonetheless, to the extent that there is sense and profit in talking about abortion
and its regulation-as there must be in a society that takes both the process of
lawmaking and the well-being of citizens seriously-there is more to say.
There is also some indication this is a good time to do so. At the moment,
the right to abortion seems relatively secure, at least as a matter of constitutional
law.11 4 Without the threatened reversal of Roe looming over everything, as it has
for some 40 years, there is perhaps room to consider aspects of abortion that were
thought too risky, from an advocacy perspective, to discuss.
In other ways too, abortion has become a more acceptable, if no less
contentious, topic of discussion. It is not only that teenagers decide about it on
television. Abortion is no longer a forbidden subject as a matter of law, as was the
case under Republican administration "gag rules." Beginning with President
Reagan in 1988, a series of federal rules and regulations prohibited even the
mention of abortion in any program which received federal funds, including family
health clinics.' 15 That physicians are no longer completely gagged may not
guarantee that there is more generosity in listening to one another, but there is at
least more space." 6
To be clear, in urging that we "dust ourselves off," I do not mean that we
should start all over again and unwind the basic holding in Roe. I proceed with

NATHANIEL PERSILY ET AL., PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
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Rule' Is Formally Repealed, 3 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y 12, 13 (2000),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/4/grO3O413.html
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X Family PlanningGag Rule: Can the Government Buy up ConstitutionalRights, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 401 (1989).

116.
Popular movies tell us something about this space. While most nice girls (or
even scruffy ones) in movies still do not abort (think Knocked Up or Juno), there is now a
wider array of representations about women weighing the decision. KNOCKED UP (Universal
Pictures 2007); JUNO (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2007). Yes, in 2007, the adorable Juno gave
her baby to a childless lady with a beautifully done-up nursery, but there is also Mike

Leigh's sobering 2004 depiction in Vera Drake of the post-war prosecution of the kindliest
abortionist one could ever meet. VERA DRAKE (UK Film Council 2004). And the earlier
comedy Citizen Ruth gave us a clueless and pregnant Laura Dern ("Good God! This is a
calamity!") set upon by caricatured (I think) advocates from both sides eager to claim her as

their perfect poster child.

CITIZEN RUTH

(Miramax Films 1996). These portrayals stand in

interesting contrast to GodfatherII, where as some may remember, Kay Corleone reveals to

her stunned husband she hadn't suffered a miscarriage but had deliberately aborted her
pregnancy in order to end "this Sicilian thing": "It was an abortion, an abortion,
Michael! . . . Something that's unholy and evil." THE GODFATHER: PART II (Paramount
Pictures 1974).

872

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 54:849

abortion's basic legality firmly in place. Even so, there is much to discuss about
the shape that abortion's legality has taken and the political and constitutional
reasons why it has taken that shape. Part of the project includes considering
aspects of abortion that are often avoided, deflected, or rejected outright in existing
conversations. I have in mind, for those who support legal abortion,
acknowledging the importance of fetal life to those who oppose it. And for those
who want to criminalize abortion, there must be greater engagement with the idea
that there is something valuable about the lives of women and their families to put
in the balance.
In urging that public discussion of abortion is improved by consideration
of central concern of the other, I am not suggesting that the issue of abortion would
be put to bed if we just showed one another a little more respect. Disagreement
about abortion is not at its core a problem of civility, though we do know the
damage and intellectual intransigence that results from uncivil and fractious
exchange-for example, a Republican congressman shouting "baby-killer" on the
floor of the House during the health care debate (and at a pro-life legislator)."'
After 40 years of contention, disagreement about abortion is unlikely to melt away
like the Wicked Witch of the West.
At the same time, in a civil society, points of affinity are worth pursuing
for their own sake, even if they do not conclusively resolve the contentious debate
that abortion has become in our county." 8 Yet even when the stakes are high and
intractable, things can sometimes be made better. Pro-choice people are not
murderers and pro-life people are not idiots. It is therefore worth pushing a bit
further on how abortion regulation works and whether it can be defended-taking
into account everything that is at stake in the debate on both sides.

V. WHAT'S AT STAKE
What exactly are the deep concerns of each side that seem to go
unacknowledged by the other? For those who oppose legal abortion, the heart of
the matter is the unassailable (for them) value of fetal life from the moment of
conception. From the pro-choice side, the cherished value is the value of women's
lives as secured by the right to decide and to implement reproductive decisions.
In urging that more attention be paid by each side to the other's concern,
it is worth pausing for a moment to consider briefly why this hasn't happened in
the past. The view that protected personhood starts at conception has been
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challenged for a number of familiar reasons. Some of these reasons are anchored in
biology (the question of what level of neurological development constitutes a
person or registers pain or produces sentience);" 9 others have had a theological
basis (the historically changing views on ensoulment); still others are more
philosophical in nature.' 20
There has also been strategic opposition to the proposition that life starts
at conception. To acknowledge that there might be something to fetal life-that
fetal life might have a claim to characterization as human life-has risked
conceding the core of the anti-abortion case (that it is murder). I want to develop a
more complicated and I think, more accurate account of women's views on fetal
life, recognizing that the category of "woman" is itself formidable, dense, and
diverse. Surely it is possible to support (and to say one supports) legal abortion and
at the same time to appreciate or value (and to say one appreciates or values, if that
is the case) fetal life. But this is getting ahead of my story. Right now we are
reviewing the sorts of arguments made against taking seriously the central pro-life
concern that human life starts at conception. Most of these counter-arguments are
familiar; many are persuasive.
There is, however, one argument about the pro-life position that gets us
nowhere in terms of talking together about abortion. This is the argument that prolife people cannot mean what they say when they say that a human fetus is the
moral equivalent of human child. In his important 1993 book Life's Dominion,
Ronald Dworkin summarizes the "standard view" of what each side in the abortion
debate says it believes:
One side thinks the human fetus is already a moral subject, an
unborn child from the moment of conception. The other side thinks
that a just conceived fetus is merely a collection of cells, no more a
child than a just fertilized chicken egg is a chicken or an acorn is an
oak.121
Dworkin is particularly concerned about the "highly ambiguous claim"
that the "scalding rhetoric of the pro-life movement seems to presuppose" that "a
fetus is from the moment of its conception a full moral person with rights and
interests equal in importance to any other member of the moral community." 22
What both sides believe, he explains, is that all forms of human life have innate
value and are in this sense sacred: "[A]lmost everyone who opposes abortion really
objects to it" not because they really think an embryo is a person but because they
believe that "it is intrinsically a bad thing . . . when human life at any stage is
deliberately extinguished." 23
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Dworkin's argument about sacredness is powerful and persuasive: The
intrinsic value of human life may well identify what truly concerns everyone about
abortion. But it is less the soundness of the argument than Dworkin's view about
what people really think. The problem is not tone, even though no one is ever too
thrilled about being told what they "really" think. Rather, I think that Dworkin is
wrong in substance about what many pro-life people now think. The citizens of
South Dakota have inscribed the view into state law, defining abortion as the
termination of "the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being."' 24 Even
discounting for its symbolic and instrumental value, the language expresses a new
attitude toward embryonic life. It is as though the acorn now instantiatesthe oak.
In this regard, consider the dramatic opening of natural law philosophers Robert
George and Christopher Tollefsen's book Embryo: A Defense of Human Life.125
The authors describe how little Noah Benton Markham, "one of the youngest
residents of New Orleans to be saved from Katrina," was nearly drowned in the
hurricane's flood waters but was at last rescued through the heroic efforts of ten
emergency responders.126 It turns out that at the time of his rescue, Noah was an
embryo floating along with 1400 other frozen embryos in a canister of liquid
nitrogen.127 George and Tollefsen conclude that "if those officers had never made
it to Noah's hospital, there can be little doubt that the toll of Katrina would have
been fourteen hundred human beings higher than it already was."l 28
I myself have serious doubts about calculating Katrina's death toll this
way. I think frozen embryos, and not little children, would have been lost had the
nitrogen canister gone under. (Which is not to say that frozen embryos have no
intrinsic value.) But I have no doubt that George and Tollefsen, sophisticated
natural law scholars, believe that embryos are endowed with exactly what Ronald
Dworkin finds impossible to accept that they really mean: "rights and interests
equal in importance to those of any other member of the moral community."l 29
Moreover, I think it is not possible to talk to Robert George or others about
abortion-as I think it is important to do-without accepting that his position on
the matter is exactly what he says it is. Certainly, some demonstrations of fetal
personhood are hard to take. In 2011, two fetuses "testified" before an Ohio
legislative committee in support of a bill banning abortion after the detection of a
fetal heartbeat. 130 The witnesses' mothers were hooked up to ultrasound machines
and the images projected onto a giant screen so that committee members could see
and hear the amplified heartbeat pulses. To many, widescreen fetal testimony may
seem just like a piece of political showmanship.

124.
125.

CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (Supp. 2008).
ROBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO:

S.D.

A

DEFENSE OF

HUMAN LIFE 2 (2008).

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id.

supra note 36, at 13.
William Hershey, Fetuses' Heartbeats Played at House Hearing, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, March 3, 2011, at A4; Julie Carr Smyth, Abortion Foes Using Images To
Make Point-Hardto Ignore Fetus with Beating Heart, COM. APPEAL, March 6, 2011, at
A9.
DWORKIN,

2012]1

ABOUT ABORTION

875

But it is neither political showmanship (at one end of the persuasion
scale) nor philosophical argumentation (at the other) that produces the increasing
naturalness of regarding fetuses as persons in ways that once might have seemed
impossible. For in addition to whatever biological criteria the fetus meets for its
being a human (as opposed to a frog), and whatever intrinsic value it has for its
sacredness, it also has come to have some of the social attributes of a child in ways
that were not so 30 years ago. (Thus Dworkin's critique may simply be outdated.)
A mix of reinforcing practices and beliefs, elaborated by the use of fetal imagery,
has led to a realization of the fetus as a child, not only in the generic-bumpersticker sense ("I'm a Child, not a Choice!") but as a participating member of a
family. Within weeks of conception, many fetuses have a known sex, a name, and
a page on Facebook. In wanted pregnancies, social birth-the identification and
incorporation of a child into its family during pregnancy-often precedes
biological birth.131 The phenomenon contributes to attitudes about fetal life more
generally, though it is important to remember that "social birth" is not a legal
category or status. Recognizing that a fetus may be a child within his family
(indeed, some readers may have thought of their own fetuses this way) provides a
means of understanding, without necessarily accepting, a central claim in the antiabortion position.
And what fundamental piece of the pro-choice argument remains
undervalued? The answer is deference to women's right to live under
circumstances of dignity as full persons in the world. The conception of dignity
has both substantive and procedural dimensions: what women are permitted by law
to decide, and how they are treated by law as they decide. 132 This more complete
and equal manner of negotiating one's life is impossible without control over
decisions regarding reproduction. While this holds for all manner of reproductive
control, including contraception, I want here to refine our sense of the kinds of
harm that are at stake with abortion. Certainly much attention has been paid to the
harms women suffer when they are unable to get abortions at all: the toll
motherhood takes on their bodies and the constraints it imposes on women's
ability to participate and to flourish in the market, in a profession, or in any other
realm of endeavor. We are also woefully familiar with the harms that are suffered
when women are unable to get legal abortions. Protecting women's health was at
the heart of abortion reform in the twentieth century, and remains the abiding
concern of reproductive rights movements in other countries today.' There has,
however, been little public discussion of the harms women suffer by virtue of
abortion regulation, even when they are able in the end to obtain a legal abortion.
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The omission is problematic if we are after a richer account of the stakes for
women in abortion's regulation at law.
In discussing harm, I recognize the pro-life argument about what pregnant
women are said to suffer by virtue of having abortions-the promised range of
emotional harms, such as guilt, depression, and suicide.1 34 After all, the 2005
South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion reported that nearly every one of the
2,000 women who provided statements to the Task Force experienced " trauma"
and testified that abortion was "destructive of [their] rights, interests, and health
and should not be legal."135 There is also Justice Anthony Kennedy's observation
in Gonzales v. Carhart,the 2007 case upholding a federal ban on the intact dilation
and extraction, that
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child . . .. While we find no reliable data

to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptional to conclude that
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained."l 36
But announcing how abortion affects women, even as a legislative finding or
(supreme) judicial notice is not enough. There is reliable data on the matter, and
studies indicate that the primary emotion women experience after an abortion is
relief and a feeling of well-being. This does not mean that an abortion decision
may not be a hard decision, soberly taken, or that a woman might not regret that it
is the decision to make at present. Many people wish their circumstances were
other than they are when faced with a tough choice. But that is something different
than wishing she had made a different decision.
Yet, we might consider whether there are structural reasons-reasons
connected to abortion's regulation-to explain why women sometimes report such
negative experiences. I want to suggest that women, along with everyone else in
the United States, cannot help but be aware of the public reputation of abortion.
There must be something suspect about a medical procedure excluded from public
funding, 37 denied to military personnel and dependents,138 unavailable in 87% of
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counties across the country, 139 and subject to unprecedented levels and modes of
regulation.14 0 Roe may have cleared away abortion's basic criminality, but even
non-criminal requirements can create something like sanctions. The law can
provide unpleasant options that fall short of formal retribution but still register as
punishment. Judicial bypass hearings again provide a good example of this. The
risk of public exposure and the uncertainty of outcome make the hearings a source
of great anxiety for pregnant young women, as they are meant to do. As one Texas
Supreme Court justice candidly stated, "[o]nce a minor becomes aware of what she
must go through to obtain a judicial bypass, she will choose for herself to involve
her parents."l41 There is also mandatory ultrasound, which can be understood at
some level as an attempt to punish women who go ahead even after they have been
"offered a look at their own unborn child." To borrow an old socio-legal concept,
the process is the punishment. 142
Hyper-regulation may not in every instance be intended punitively. It is,
however, based on a fundamentally different conception of women. Much current
legislation takes as its starting point that women do not quite understand what they
are doing when they decide to end a pregnancy. That is why they must be told
when human life starts, that this is their own fetus, that they could place it for
adoption, and so on: The sort of information it now takes for women to provide
legally informed consent.
This lecture is guided by a very different premise. I believe that women,
even young women, understand very well what an abortion is. Women understand
that abortion ends pregnancy and that if they have an abortion, they will not have a
baby; that is its very point. The significance of an abortion decision may differ
from woman to woman, from girl to girl. In deciding whether or not to continue a
pregnancy, each will draw upon her own sensibilities, circumstances, and beliefs.
But as with other deeply intimate decisions and commitments-who to marry,
whether to pray, how to vote, what to do with one 's life-I join others in the view
that women themselves are able and best positioned to decide what is at stake. This
returns us to the question of what abortion is about. The list is long, and the
categories complex and challenging. But they are not impenetrable. That is to say,

139.
See Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and
Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10 (2008), available
at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/abortion2.html; see also Jack Hitt, Who Will Do
Abortions Here?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 20.
See Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
140.
Control, 317 F.3d 357, 359-71 (4th Cir. 2002) (upholding various state abortion

regulations). In his dissent, Judge Robert Bruce King described the effect of abortion
regulations in other states: "[Iln many places, burdensome regulations have made abortions
effectively unavailable, if not technically illegal. It is this type of regulationmicromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop varnish to the location of the
janitors' closets-that is challenged in this case." Id. at 371-72 (King, J., dissenting).
141.
In re Jane Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346, 363 (Tex. 2000) (Enoch, J., concurring).
142.
See MALCOLM FEELY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
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women can make sense of them and decide for themselves, their children, and their
families whether or not to have another child.

